是否选择韬光养晦?
Taoguang Yanghui or not?
China’ s discourse on foreign policy strategy
Supplementary Materials
Peter Hays Gries, Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino,Luz-Eugenia Cox-Fuenzalida, and Qingmin Zhang, Contentious Histories and the Perception of Threat: China, the United States, and the Korean War; An Experimental Analysis, Journal of East Asian Studies 9 (2009), 433–465 Chinese and Korean protests over “revisionist” Japanese histories of World War II are well known. The impact of contested Chinese and US histories of the Korean War on US-China relations today has received less attention. More broadly, there has been little research seeking to systematically explore just how history textbook controversies matter for international relations. This article experimentally manipulates the impact of nation (US/China), of source (in-group/out-group textbooks), and of valence (positive/negative historical narratives) on measures of beliefs about the past, emotions, collective selfesteem, and threat perception in present-day US-China relations. A 2 × 2 × 2 design exposed randomized groups of Chinese and US university students to fictional high school history textbook accounts of the Korean War. Findings reveal significant effects of nation, source, and valence and suggest that the “historical relevance” of a shared past to national identities in the present has a dramatic impact on how historical controversies affect threat perception.
Michael D. Swaine, China’s Assertive Behavior. Part One: On “Core Interests”, Swaine,
China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 Among both casual observers and experts alike, the single most dominant theme in Sino-U.S. relations of the past year or more has been the emergence of a more “assertive China.” In CLM 32, we examined how both Chinese and outside observers look at China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage, that is, the purely perceptual dimensions of the issue. In this and several subsequent CLMs, we intend to assess whether, to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States: First, in defining and promoting the concept of “core interests”; second, with regard to U.S. political and military behavior along China’s maritime periphery; third, concerning a variety of economic, trade, and finance issues, from so-called indigenous innovation to global standards regarding reserve currencies; and fourth, with regard to several issues related to international security, from counter-proliferation to climate change. In each of these four areas, we shall to varying degrees attempt to answer several basic questions regarding Chinese assertiveness that build on those addressed in CLM 32: In what ways are Chinese leaders becoming more assertive, employing what methods, and to what apparent ends? Is Chinese assertiveness a “new” and highly significant phenomenon for U.S. interests, and if so, in what manner? What misconceptions, if any, exist about China’s assertiveness? What internal and external forces are driving China’s assertive behavior? In particular, is Chinese assertiveness associated with particular interest groups or factions within Chinese state and society? How is China’s assertiveness evolving in response to both inside and outside pressures? And finally, what do the answers to the foregoing questions tell us about the likely future direction and strength of China’s assertiveness over the next several years?
Zhang, Qingmin, Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign policy: Bringing Leadership Personality back in The effort to bridge general IR theory with areas studies has made remarkable progress in the study of Chinese foreign policy. Yet there has little research in integrating the theory on personality type or the leader type to the Chinese case. This paper intends to show how this gap may be filled by employing one popular framework on leadership personality type to the Chinese case in an attempt to see if it could help explain the differences in Chinese foreign policy during Mao and Deng’s time. Findings demonstrate that the integration of the two empirically helps better explain and understand the different foreign policy orientation, general strategies, main themes of China’s foreign policy during Mao and Deng’s time as well as China’s different foreign policy toward major areas and countries. Theoretically such integration tests the applicability of the comparative foreign policy analysis theory and is significantly helpful to develop a more general theory that would fare better beyond the borders of the US. The conclusion also calls for the necessity to have an integrative perspective which would bring leadership personality back in studying Chinese foreign policy.
