#07 – reading list

event #07
April, 26 2011

Taoguang Yanghui or not?
China’ s discourse on foreign policy strategy

Supplementary Materials

  1. Peter Hays Gries, Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino,Luz-Eugenia Cox-Fuenzalida, and Qingmin
    Zhang, Contentious Histories and the Perception of Threat: China, the United States, and the
    Korean War; An Experimental Analysis, Journal of East Asian Studies 9 (2009), 433–465
    Chinese and Korean protests over “revisionist” Japanese histories of World War II are well known. The
    impact of contested Chinese and US histories of the Korean War on US-China relations today has
    received less attention. More broadly, there has been little research seeking to systematically explore
    just how history textbook controversies matter for international relations. This article experimentally
    manipulates the impact of nation (US/China), of source (in-group/out-group textbooks), and of
    valence (positive/negative historical narratives) on measures of beliefs about the past, emotions,
    collective selfesteem, and threat perception in present-day US-China relations. A 2 × 2 × 2 design
    exposed randomized groups of Chinese and US university students to fictional high school history
    textbook accounts of the Korean War. Findings reveal significant effects of nation, source, and valence
    and suggest that the “historical relevance” of a shared past to national identities in the present has a
    dramatic impact on how historical controversies affect threat perception.
  2. Michael D. Swaine, China’s Assertive Behavior. Part One: On “Core Interests”, Swaine,
    China Leadership Monitor, no. 34
    Among both casual observers and experts alike, the single most dominant theme in Sino-U.S. relations
    of the past year or more has been the emergence of a more “assertive China.” In CLM 32, we examined
    how both Chinese and outside observers look at China’s growing assertiveness on the international
    stage, that is, the purely perceptual dimensions of the issue. In this and several subsequent CLMs, we
    intend to assess whether, to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming
    more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States: First, in defining and
    promoting the concept of “core interests”; second, with regard to U.S. political and military behavior
    along China’s maritime periphery; third, concerning a variety of economic, trade, and finance issues,
    from so-called indigenous innovation to global standards regarding reserve currencies; and fourth,
    with regard to several issues related to international security, from counter-proliferation to climate
    In each of these four areas, we shall to varying degrees attempt to answer several basic questions
    regarding Chinese assertiveness that build on those addressed in CLM 32: In what ways are Chinese
    leaders becoming more assertive, employing what methods, and to what apparent ends? Is Chinese
    assertiveness a “new” and highly significant phenomenon for U.S. interests, and if so, in what manner?
    What misconceptions, if any, exist about China’s assertiveness? What internal and external forces are
    driving China’s assertive behavior? In particular, is Chinese assertiveness associated with particular
    interest groups or factions within Chinese state and society? How is China’s assertiveness evolving in
    response to both inside and outside pressures? And finally, what do the answers to the foregoing
    questions tell us about the likely future direction and strength of China’s assertiveness over the next
    several years?
  3. Zhang, Qingmin, Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign policy: Bringing
    Leadership Personality back in
    The effort to bridge general IR theory with areas studies has made remarkable progress in the study of
    Chinese foreign policy. Yet there has little research in integrating the theory on personality type or the
    leader type to the Chinese case. This paper intends to show how this gap may be filled by employing
    one popular framework on leadership personality type to the Chinese case in an attempt to see if it
    could help explain the differences in Chinese foreign policy during Mao and Deng’s time. Findings
    demonstrate that the integration of the two empirically helps better explain and understand the
    different foreign policy orientation, general strategies, main themes of China’s foreign policy during
    Mao and Deng’s time as well as China’s different foreign policy toward major areas and countries.
    Theoretically such integration tests the applicability of the comparative foreign policy analysis theory
    and is significantly helpful to develop a more general theory that would fare better beyond the borders
    of the US. The conclusion also calls for the necessity to have an integrative perspective which would
    bring leadership personality back in studying Chinese foreign policy.