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#07 – reading list
event #07
April, 26 2011
是否选择韬光养晦?
Taoguang Yanghui or not?
China’ s discourse on foreign policy strategy
Supplementary Materials
- Peter Hays Gries, Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino,Luz-Eugenia Cox-Fuenzalida, and Qingmin
Zhang, Contentious Histories and the Perception of Threat: China, the United States, and the
Korean War; An Experimental Analysis, Journal of East Asian Studies 9 (2009), 433–465
Chinese and Korean protests over “revisionist” Japanese histories of World War II are well known. The
impact of contested Chinese and US histories of the Korean War on US-China relations today has
received less attention. More broadly, there has been little research seeking to systematically explore
just how history textbook controversies matter for international relations. This article experimentally
manipulates the impact of nation (US/China), of source (in-group/out-group textbooks), and of
valence (positive/negative historical narratives) on measures of beliefs about the past, emotions,
collective selfesteem, and threat perception in present-day US-China relations. A 2 × 2 × 2 design
exposed randomized groups of Chinese and US university students to fictional high school history
textbook accounts of the Korean War. Findings reveal significant effects of nation, source, and valence
and suggest that the “historical relevance” of a shared past to national identities in the present has a
dramatic impact on how historical controversies affect threat perception.
- Michael D. Swaine, China’s Assertive Behavior. Part One: On “Core Interests”, Swaine,
China Leadership Monitor, no. 34
Among both casual observers and experts alike, the single most dominant theme in Sino-U.S. relations
of the past year or more has been the emergence of a more “assertive China.” In CLM 32, we examined
how both Chinese and outside observers look at China’s growing assertiveness on the international
stage, that is, the purely perceptual dimensions of the issue. In this and several subsequent CLMs, we
intend to assess whether, to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming
more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States: First, in defining and
promoting the concept of “core interests”; second, with regard to U.S. political and military behavior
along China’s maritime periphery; third, concerning a variety of economic, trade, and finance issues,
from so-called indigenous innovation to global standards regarding reserve currencies; and fourth,
with regard to several issues related to international security, from counter-proliferation to climate
change.
In each of these four areas, we shall to varying degrees attempt to answer several basic questions
regarding Chinese assertiveness that build on those addressed in CLM 32: In what ways are Chinese
leaders becoming more assertive, employing what methods, and to what apparent ends? Is Chinese
assertiveness a “new” and highly significant phenomenon for U.S. interests, and if so, in what manner?
What misconceptions, if any, exist about China’s assertiveness? What internal and external forces are
driving China’s assertive behavior? In particular, is Chinese assertiveness associated with particular
interest groups or factions within Chinese state and society? How is China’s assertiveness evolving in
response to both inside and outside pressures? And finally, what do the answers to the foregoing
questions tell us about the likely future direction and strength of China’s assertiveness over the next
several years?
- Zhang, Qingmin, Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign policy: Bringing
Leadership Personality back in
The effort to bridge general IR theory with areas studies has made remarkable progress in the study of
Chinese foreign policy. Yet there has little research in integrating the theory on personality type or the
leader type to the Chinese case. This paper intends to show how this gap may be filled by employing
one popular framework on leadership personality type to the Chinese case in an attempt to see if it
could help explain the differences in Chinese foreign policy during Mao and Deng’s time. Findings
demonstrate that the integration of the two empirically helps better explain and understand the
different foreign policy orientation, general strategies, main themes of China’s foreign policy during
Mao and Deng’s time as well as China’s different foreign policy toward major areas and countries.
Theoretically such integration tests the applicability of the comparative foreign policy analysis theory
and is significantly helpful to develop a more general theory that would fare better beyond the borders
of the US. The conclusion also calls for the necessity to have an integrative perspective which would
bring leadership personality back in studying Chinese foreign policy.